Abstract
Introduction
The Finance-Growth nexus has been one of the most vibrant research issues in economics in recent years. The probing question is whether financial sector causes economic growth or the causality runs the other way or whether there is any other third factor(s) that causes both financial sector growth and economic growth. Recent literature surveys conclude that financial sector is a catalyst for economic growth (Levine, 1997 (Levine, , 2005 and World Bank 1989) . Understanding the microeconomic and institutional determinants of financial sector development has recently attracted considerable attention both from theorists and empiricists (Fergusson, 2006; Beck and Levine, 2005) . Law, finance and growth literature emphasizes that the differences in legal origin explain the difference in financial sector development across countries (LLSV, 1998 (LLSV, , 1999 Djankov et al., 2006) . Another strand of literature that places institutions in the center argues that not merely legal origin but the institutional differences broadly account for differences in financial sector growth across the countries 1 .
The important sources of financial development and economic growth identified in finance and growth literature could be broadly classified into legal and institutional factors and financial regulation. There is a complex relationship between these factors as one of them leading to the other. In this paper we endeavor to uncover the nature of these determinants, their inter-linkages and implications for the financial sector and economic growth using innovative measures and recent empirical time series techniques.
Drawing from the literature on 'Finance and Growth', 'Law and Finance' and New Institutional Economics, we intend to incorporate legal developments and institutional factors into the model of long run relationship between finance and growth to complete the causal link between the determinants of financial sector growth, financial sector and economic growth. We hypothesize that legal and institutional factors would act upon financial sector and ultimately economic growth through the channels of wide availability of external finance by imparting confidence on the system. India seems to be an interesting testing ground to analyze the long run impact of legal and institutional developments, as there were significant legal, regulatory and institutional developments in the last decades. This paper extends the literature on law and finance in two aspects. First, we construct a number of indices to measure legal, regulatory developments over the years and use institutional measures innovatively to capture the country specific details missing in the crosscountry analysis. Second, we utilize modern multivariate time series techniques such as Johansen's maximum likelihood Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to establish long run equilibrium relationship between financial sector and it is determinants and eventually economics growth.
The paper proceeds in six sections. Section two begins with a brief review of the literature on financial development and its effect on growth and also identifies the gap in law and finance literature. Section three provides an outline of legal and regulatory developments in Indian financial sector. Section four elaborates on the variables used in the study and the methodology used for constructing index of legal, institutional and regulatory developments. Section five gives a brief summary of econometric methodology. Results and interpretations are in section six. Conclusion follows.
II. Law, Finance and Economic Growth
The interest in the relationship between finance and growth dates back to Schumpeter (1911) and Hicks (1969) and revived in the 1970's by McKinnon and Shaw (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) . The subsequent outburst of empirical research and the developments in endogenous growth theory established a positive link between finance and growth (Levine, 2006; Greenwood, J. and B. Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991) . On the onset, excessive financial sector regulation dubbed as financial repression was put forth as a cause of financial underdevelopment and consequently economic underdevelopment. Latter developments in growth theories and empirical literature emanated from financial repressionist school established a negative relationship between financial repression measures and economic growth 2 . To summarize, repressionist policies such as interest rate controls, high reserve requirements and directed lending, worked as a tax on the financial sector, drove real rates of interest negative, discouraged saving, thus curtailed investment and innovation and consequently economic growth.
Further developments include a lot of cross-country studies intending to explain the determinants of financial sector growth, incorporated legal and institutional factors in explaining the fundamental difference in financial sector growth across countries (La Porta et. al. 1997 and Beck and Levine, 2003) . Law and Finance literature attributed financial sector growth disparities to legal developments measured by investor and creditor protection structured in a country's contract, company, securities and bankruptcy laws, private property rights protection and contract enforcement (La Porta et. al. 1997 and . The key channel of causation between financial sector and institutional developments is mitigation of asymmetric information and ultimately the transaction cost of raising external funds. This means a vibrant debt and stock market, as financial sector transactions with a strong legal protection are less uncertain. This would increase the availability of external finance and thus economic growth. The early authors made use of comparative law literature and captured legal development with the help of broad legal origin classification. Legal origin serves as an instrument in the empirical analysis because there is a high correlation between legal origins and the indicators of legal development as different legal traditions place varied emphasis on private property rights and investor protection and their ability to adapt to new developments differs (Beck and Levine, 2005) .
Predominantly these are all cross-country studies that try to account for growth differences. One of the main criticisms of cross-country growth regressions is that they establish correlation not causation between finance and growth. Cross country regression are based on unrealistic assumptions such as equal growth path and equal weighting of countries and also suffer omitted variable bias and sample selection bias (Barro, 1991) .
This led to a proliferation of studies that used time series techniques to establish much needed causation between financial development and economic growth. Availability of long time series data on a large number of countries and recent break-throughs in multiple time series analysis led way to a number of studies such as Jung (1986) , Demetriades and Hussein (1996) , Demetriades and Luintel (1997) , Khan (1999), and Bell and Rousseau (2001) among others on a selection of countries. These studies produced a mixed result as some of them report a robust causation running from finance to economic growth (Bell and Rousseau, 2001 ) and some of the most influential studies conclude that finance growth nexus is country specific (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel & Khan, 1999) .
However these time series studies do not delve into what causes financial sector development to start with. Also some of these studies fall into the trap of oversimplifying the relationship by restricting to a bivariate relationship between finance and growth (Luintel & Khan, 1999) . Proposing a bivariate relationship between financial development and economic growth suffers an omitted variable bias and could lead to erroneous causal inferences (Lutkepohl, 1982) . Any model aims a causality test between finance and growth should contain conditioning variables such as institutional development and regulatory environment. Also from a policy perspective these studies offer little on the course of action for a developing country with a supposedly underdeveloped financial system to move on to higher growth trajectory.
This lacuna calls for a detailed time series study that explicitly introduce legal and institutional developments and financial regulation index in a multivariate framework to complete the logical link from legal and institutional developments to financial development to economic growth. Countries that have implemented financial liberalization policies and evolved a legal and regulatory mechanism to cope with the needs of vibrant financial sector would be an excellent testing ground. As there were significant legal, regulatory and institutional developments, post independent India, with a rich source of time series data for about 50 years seems to be an interesting case for testing the long run causal relationship between law and finance.
III. Financial sector in India
Financial sector in India, until the recent past, was one of the most protected and regulated sectors. All the elements of financial repression (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) were present i.e. banks were to follow strict prudential norms such as Cash Reserve Ratio and Statutory Liquidity Ratio, and invest in government securities; mandated to lend out a stipulated proportion of the total advances to the priority sector and government sponsored social security schemes; mandated to open four branches in the rural areas for every branch in the urban centres (Panchamukhi, 2001) . There was substantial under-lending to the industry (Banerjee et al, 2003) and banks had resorted to the practice of 'lazy banking' i.e. invested more then stipulated proportion of total assets in safe havens like government bonds. There are empirical evidences of lack of efficiency, poor performance, lack of competition and outmoded technology in the pre-reform period (GOI, 1991) .
Even though social banking was successful in achieving many of the objectives such as spreading the banking services to rural areas and extending credit facilities to the priority sector, it led to severe banking sector crisis (Singhal, 2004) . Thus many of the root causes of underdeveloped financial sector and banking sector crisis in the early 1990's in India were argued to be rooted in excessive regulation (Singhal, 2004) . The Narasimhan Committee (1991) was constituted to recommend reforms in banking sector. The committee identified the major lacuna in the system to be huge non-performing assets (NPA), over staffing and underlending to the commercial sector. They proposed deregulation of interest rate, reduction of Statutory Liquidity Ratio 3 (SLR) and Cash Reserve Ratio 4 (CRR) limits and reduction of compulsory lending to priority sector. Reforms in the 1990's include gradual reduction in capital adequacy and prudential regulations such as the Cash Reserve Ratio and the Statutory Liquidity Ratio to increase the loanable fund in the hands of commercial banks. New accounting and disclosure standards were set to improve the efficiency and profitability of the sector and entry deregulation for both domestic and foreign banks to enhance competition in the sector. Interest rates were also deregulated.
One of the major causes of non-viability of banking that were inadequately dealt with in the empirical literature is the legal apparatus for financial development. The regulator was basically concerned of channelling the funds to the desired sectors i.e. to the government for development expenditures and to the priority sector as a part of broader development objectives through credit limits and interest rate control. But little attention was given to the viability of financing these objectives, as there was no effective protection against contract defaulting.
The major cause of ineffective legal protection of the creditors is the complex procedure of asset liquidation (Visaria, 2006) . Recovery of bad debts in India before banking sector reforms was fairly difficult process. The Law Commission of India (1988) notes that around 40% of asset liquidation cases are pending for more than 8 years in various civil courts. Banks, to recover the debt from the defaulter, should file a case in a civil court stating particulars of the case and request the court to liquidate the assets of the borrower to recover the debt. Courts followed Code of Civil Procedure (1908) that allowed numerous appeals. This all could escalate the time taken to recover the debt. Thus there was a need for reforming the legal procedures that set the rules of the game in the sector to make business viable. These reforms were expected to bring in a drastic change in the portfolio behaviour of banks such as their ability to substitute commercial credit for other investments such as government securities. Reforms in prudential norms left a high proportion of bank's total assets for credit disbursal. With effective and faster legal arrangements to curb default, risk associated with commercial credit was lowered. We expect that along with these developments a gradual improvement in people's confidence in securing property rights and contract enforcement measured by CIM helped financial sector to grow fast in the 1990's.
IV. Data & Methodology
There are a number of measures in the literature that captures different aspects of financial sector development such as sheer size of the sector to its ability to conduit the resources to most productive sector. As the first measure of financial sector development we have used financial deepening i.e. ratio of M2 over nominal GDP that captures the overall size of the formal financial intermediary sector (King and Levine, 1993 a, b; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; World Bank, 1989; Levine, 1997; and Beck et al., 2000) . However this measure is criticized that it captures the extensive use of currency in circulation i.e. the extent of monetization rather than money directed towards banking system. Demetriades and Hussein (1997) have used the ratio of M2 minus currency to nominal GDP as a proxy for financial development and Luintel and Khan (1999) used M2 minus currency to one period lagged nominal GDP. Our second measure of financial depth (FDM) is M2 minus currency to one period lagged nominal GDP.
Thirdly, we use private credit (CR), which is the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to nominal GDP. Private credit has been proved to be one of the better measures of financial sector development in the literature (Levine, 2005) . Private credit excludes credits issued by the central bank and banks' loans to the government. This captures the importance of the intermediary sector in the system by the extent of its usefulness in transferring the resources to the productive use.
Along with these conventional measures of financial development we also introduce a new variable overall Index of Financial Development (FD), the first principle component that captures the maximum variations in all the conventional measures. Since the first component accounts for about 95% of the standardized variance in the variables, we have decided to use it as a composite index of financial development.
Following standard practice, we use real GDP per capita (PGDP) as our measure for economic development (King and Levine, 1993a, b; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996 and others) . In addition to the real GDP per capita and the financial development indicator, we introduce a third variable to our VAR system, such as index of legal (LD), institutional (CIM) and regulatory developments (FR). Due to data inadequacy, we use a trivariate VAR to assess the impact of legal, institutional and financial repression independent of one another on financial sector development and economic growth.
All conventional measures of financial sector such as M2, credit to private sector, nominal and real GDP are also taken from National Accounts Statistics of India: 1950-51 to 2003-04 provided by EPW research foundation. All variables are quoted in local currency if not mentioned specifically. The data are converted into natural logarithms so that they can be interpreted in growth terms after taking the first difference.
A) Index of Legal Development (LD)
Various measures of legal development are used in the law and finance literature to analyze the possible effect of law on financial sector. In a series of influential studies La Porta et al., (1997 Porta et al., ( , 1998 ) established a significant positive relationship between the index of investor and creditor protection and financial sector growth across the countries. The index of investor protection consists of seven binary variables 5 and one continuous variable 6 to measure the rights granted to the shareholders in the books against the insiders of the firms. The index of creditor rights 7 consists of four binary variables and one continuous variable 8 . These two indices together capture the extent to which the rights of shareholders and creditors are protected in a country. These indices were further extended through time and space over 100 countries for a few years (Djankov, 2006) .
India fares well in both the indices (LLSV, 1998) particularly in the index of investor protection India is ranked among the most protected countries in the sample with a value of 5 5 1. "One Share One Vote" -"Equals one if … requires that ordinary shares carry one vote per share, and zero otherwise", 2. "proxy by mail allowed" -"the … law … allows shareholder to mail their proxy vote to the firm", 3. "shares not blocked before meeting" -"the … law … does not allow firms to require that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general meeting, thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days", 4. "cumulative voting or proportional representation" -"the … law … allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of directors (cumulative voting) or … a mechanism of proportional representation by which minority interests may name a proportional number of directors to the board", 5. "Oppressed minorities mechanism" -"the … law … grants minority shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in the articles of incorporation. … Minority shareholders are defined as those shareholders who own 10 percent of share capital or less", 6. "Preemptive rights" -"the … law … grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new issues of stock, and this right can be waived only by a shareholders' vote", 7. "Percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting … is less than or equal to 10% (the sample median)" 6 Proportion of net profits companies need to distribute among shareholders as mandatory dividend (zero in case of no such clause). The "Creditors' rights" index, the sum of the values of these four binary variables, therefore ranges between zero and four. 1. if the law imposes restrictions like creditors' consent to file for reorganization; 2. if there is no automatic stay on secured assets on filing the reorganization petition; 3. if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds of asset sales of a bankrupt firm; 4. if management is replaced by a representative of the court or creditors during the reorganization period.
out of maximum possible 6. Shareholders rights are well protected as almost all of the clauses above mentioned are allowed in India except the one share-one vote principle 9 , i. With all the four clauses such as secured creditor paid first in case of reorganization, no automatic stay, provisions for reorganizing the management and restrictions on reorganization provided in the law, India is one of the best protected countries in LLSV (1998) index of creditor rights with the rank of 4 out of 4.
Put together this indicates a promising legal scenario in India. Given this with a relatively under developed financial sector, India seems to be an outlier in the cross-country analysis.
The important reason proposed in the literature for the poor performance of countries that have well protected in books is lax enforcement. LLSV (1998) uses Rule of Law index that ranks India among the lowest countries in the sample, where they have used private country risk ratings as an enforcement measure. These evidences show that in India the laws in the books are only paper tigers as enforcement and rule of law is weak and court delays are common (Visaria, 2006) . Thus, we propose to construct an index that captures the provisional innovation in the law in India that makes enforcement quicker and availing the legal service cheaper. We hypothesize that these innovations in the law would have caused financial sector development in the recent times. Djankov et al., (2007) extend the "creditor rights" index constructed by La Porta et al., (1997 Porta et al., ( , 1998 to measure the impacts of legal reforms over the period 1978 -2003 on credit market. They add a value of one if a country introduces a legal reform to empower shareholders. At the end of the period India has a value of 2 with a small change from 3 in the beginning of the period. There is not much variation in the time series index of shareholder and creditor protection constructed as a multinomial dummy over a period of 45 years from 1960 to 2004 as in Djankov et al., (2006 These innovations aimed to speed up the dispute redress would reduce the resources spent on enforcing financial contracts. This time series index that shows a dramatic increase in the 1990's coincides with the fastest period in Indian financial sector development.
B) Index of Financial Regulation (FD)
Index of financial repression can be constructed from data available on directed lending program, statutory liquidity ratio and other interest rate controls such as deposit rate and lending rate ceiling and floor from the Reserve bank of India (RBI) database. We extend the index of financial repression constructed by Demetriades and Luintel (1997) . They have constructed the index that consists of fixed deposit dummy, deposit rate ceiling dummy, deposit rate floor dummy, fixed rate ceiling rate dummy, lending rate ceiling rate dummy, lending rate floor dummy, required reserve ratio, liquidity ratio and directed credit program for the years 1960 to 1993. We have extended the index for the years 1960 to 2004. Our index of financial repression is an all-encompassing index that includes both interest rate and noninterest rate controls. It is a weighted average of the first seven principle components that account for 99% percentage of total variation 18 .
C) Index of Institutional Development (CIM)
Institutions that cause economic growth evolve very slowly over a period of time and getting a ready-made time series of an institutional indicator is nearly impossible. However, Clague et al., (1999) have proposed an objective measure of property rights protection and contract enforcement, Contract-Intensive Money, which is easily available for a long period of time (Clague et al., 1999) . This is measured as a ratio of broad money net of currency in circulation to broad money ((M2-C)/M2). This could be interpreted as the proportion of economic activities in an economy that involved non-monetary payments. These nonmonetary payments require a strong third party enforcement mechanism such as a well defined legal set up to back it up. If the third party enforcement is absent or weak, savings from surplus units will not be transferred to intermediaries and whatever transferred to intermediaries will not reach the most productive hands but to the one with collateral to back. Thus the wealth in the country takes a form that could be easily protected such as gold and real estate rather than its most productive form. Thus Contract-Intensive Money deduces the level of confidence the agents have on the system from their choice of non-monetary payments they make.
V. Empirical Methodology
Recent developments in time series techniques provide a number of possible ways to model long run time series variables that are expected to move together. The idea behind these techniques is that the economic time series tend to move together in the long run and if they deviate from their long run equilibrium path in the short run then there will be an adjustment mechanism that restores the variables into their long run path. One of the widely used methods to analyze non-stationary time series is to introduce an 'Error Correction Mechanism', a t-1 period discrepancy in the long run relationship that has to be bridged by the equilibrating forces. For this model to be consistent the error correction term i.e. the liner combination of I(1) variables should be stationary. If the linear combination of I(1) variables is stationary then they are said to be cointegrated and Engle and Granger (1987) show that there should exists a long run relationship between the variables. There are a number of cointegration methodologies suggested in the literature such as Engle and Granger (1987) , Johansen (1991) and Johansen (1995) .
An unrestricted VAR modified to incorporate the error correction term could be used to estimate the short run, long run and equilibrium adjustment behavior of financial development indicators, economic growth and other conditioning variables such as legal development (LD), contract intensive money (CIM) and financial regulation (FR). This VAR representation has a number of advantages 1) As all the variables that enter the system are treated endogenous and there is no a priori endogenous or exogenous division of variables, 2) Lawfinance-growth is treated as a dynamic system where the variables are affected by their own and others' lagged values 3) If the variables are cointegrated then the short-run and long-run adjustment behavior among the variables could be estimated. We use Johansen's vector error correction model (VECM) to establish cointegrating relationship in a system of equations. As there are a number of preconditions that the variables should satisfy to estimate the VECM model, the following steps are followed:
Test for Order of Integration
We use Generalized Least Square Dickey -Fuller (GLSDF) test to examine the order of integration of all the variables in the system. GLSDF of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) , a variant of ADF test, tests for a unit root by a prior de-trending (de-meaning) of the data with a GLS technique and substituting the detrended variable into the ADF test. This test is said to posses more power as it is more robust than those based on DF (Elliott et al., 1996) .
One of the major shortcomings of unit root tests based on Dickey-Fuller method is that they invariably fail to reject near unit root processes in favor of unit roots. This process names as "long memory" or fractional integration do have serious implications on Johansen's cointegration results (Gonzalo and Lee 1998) . To overcome this problem we use a test proposed by KPSS (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992 ) that tests a null hypothesis of stationarity, or I(0), vis-à-vis I(1) Dickey-Fuller tests.
As the structure of the system and the output critically depend on the lags chosen to estimate the VAR and VECM, there are a number of criteria proposed in the literature such as multivariate forms of Schwartz Information Criteria, Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Hannan-Quinn Criteria. We use all these criteria to arrive at the optimal lag for the proposed models.
VCE Model specification
We specify an unrestricted VAR as a base model for the analysis.
Where A i 's are (n×n) matrix of parameters, Z is an (n×1) vector containing all n variables in the system (i.e. FD, PGDP, LD / CIM / FR), D is a vector of all deterministic terms (intercept, trend, dummies, etc), and t ∈ is an (n × 1) vector of white noise error terms.
This unrestricted base VAR could be represented as a Vector Error Correction Model if it is reparameterized as . D is an (n × 1) vector of deterministic matrix that contains the constants and dummy variables introduced in the system. t ∈ is an (n × 1) vector of white noise error terms.
is the first differenced component in the VAR system, where Γ j is an (n × n) matrix of short term adjustment coefficients associated with the lagged values of variables in the system Z t .
is the error-correction component, where Π is an (n × n) matrix of cointegrating parameters which characterize the long run relationship among the variables and long run adjustment coefficients in the VEC system. Thus Π consists of n× r dimension matrices α and β, where Π = αβ /.
The rank of ∏ matrix indicates the number of possible cointegrating relationship i.e. long run equilibrium relationship among the variables in the system. If the ∏ matrix has full rank then all the variables in the system are stationary and the error correction mechanism does not exists. If the rank of ∏ matrix is zero the short-term dynamics depends only on lagged changes in all variables. The rank of Π can be determined by λ trace or λ max test statistics. The existence of co-integration between the two variables suggests the presence of causality between the variables in at least one direction (Engle and Granger, 1987) .
Finally the impulse response function is used to quantify the dynamic impact of policy variables on the target variable. Variance decomposition could be used to predict the proportion of variation in the target variable over time due to its own shocks and shocks to other variables in the system.
Descriptive Statistics:
We begin our empirical analysis with some exploratory data analysis of the variables considered. The pure monetary measure of financial development (FDM) in log terms plotted over time in figure To establish long run relationship between the variables of interest we follow a five-step procedure. First, we test for unit roots in all variables as Johansen's cointegrating technique and VECM require the variables to be unit roots i.e. should be integrated of first order. Then we test for cointegrating relationships in the system of variables using a VAR-based cointegration test developed in Johansen (1991 Johansen ( , 1995 . As Granger representation theorem suggests if the variables are cointegrated then there must be a causal relationship among them running at least in one direction, we test for a pair wise Granger causality. Vector error correction model (VECM) is used to simultaneously determine the short run and long run relationship along with the equilibrium adjustment. Finally impulse response function is used to quantify the long run impact of one standard deviation shock of a variable on the variable of interest.
Legal Development:
Due to limited data availability we have to restrict our analysis to only a trivariate VAR based VECM. First we introduce the index of legal development along with the measures of financial sector development and economic growth to determine the long run causal relationship between legal development and financial sector.
Unit Root Test:
All the variables introduced in the system should be integrated of same order for cointegration to exist. Though a number of unit root tests are suggested in the literature, we use Generalized Least Square Dickey -Fuller (GLSDF) for the reasons discussed above. All the variables are in log form. We test for unit roots with only a constant and with constant and trend specification. The results show that all the variables are integrated of order one and stationary upon differencing. We also used an alternative test proposed by KPSS to diagnose the consistency of these results 20 . KPSS test results also confirm the results of GLSDF test. (1996) . * Significant at 1% level (-2.63 for constant only and -3.77 for constant and trend specification) **5% level (-1.95 for constant only and -3.19 for constant and trend specification) ***10% level (-1.61 for constant only and -2.89 for constant and trend specification)
Cointegration Results:
As all the variables contain unit root we test for cointegration relationship among financial sector development indicators, per capita GDP (PGDP) and index of legal development (LD) using the Johansen cointegration test. With the help of lag length selection criteria we have chosen the lag length to be 2. Table 3 presents both trace statistic (λ trace) and eigenvalues (λ max) provided by Johansen for the hypothesis that there is no cointegration relationship (r = 0) with the alternative hypothesis being (r = 1) one cointegration relation and two cointegration relations respectively. Also the Eigenvalues of the Π matrix is presented for the hypothesis of no, one and two cointegrating relationships. The null hypothesis of no cointegration among the models specified is rejected at 5 percent level in all the cases in favor of the alternative of at least one cointegrating relationship. All the variables introduced in the system have a tendency to move together towards long-run steady state equilibrium. 
Long run Causality Test:
As there exist cointegrating relationship in all the models we use pair wise Granger nonCausality Test 21 to ascertain the direction of causality. We here test if legal development affects economic growth via financial sector growth. If there is a robust causation running from legal development (LD) to financial sector development measures and from the latter to economic growth then we could conclude that legal development indirectly causes economic growth by making financial sector vibrant.
The results 22 indicate that there is a strong causation between legal development and financial sector growth with a strong feed back effect. This feedback effect is not unexpected as there is minimum threshold level of financial sector development required for initiating legal developments. All the indicators of financial development seem to have caused economic growth with little feed back from the latter to the former except for FDM that shows a strong feed back from economic growth significant at 5 % level. And the legal developments independent of financial sector Granger cause economic growth. This gives a strong evidence of legal developments leading to economic growth with financial sector channel and also enhancing it independently.
VECM Results:
VECM specification for legal development, financial sector growth and economic growth are summarized in table 3. To quantify the long run relationship between legal development (LD), Per capita GDP (PGDP) and financial sector indicators the cointegrating equation is normalized with respect to financial sector indicators. A negative loading on LD in the normalized cointegrating equation along with a negative adjustment coefficient indicates that a reduction in the stationary combination due to an increase in LD will produce an upward adjustment in financial sector indicators.
Cointegrating parameter for legal development is however significant but seems to have a wrong sign. But for FDM specification the coefficient sign is negative indicating that there is a positive long run equilibrium relationship between legal development, financial sector and economic growth. However in terms of magnitude they have unusually big values. On the other hand all the adjustment coefficients do have expected negative sign for all the specifications and are statistically significant. The magnitude of these values shows the speed of adjustment back to its long run equilibrium level i.e. about 15% of disequilibrium from the long run behavior is corrected due to financial sector development. Disequilibrium seems to be reduced faster by changes in financial sector development and legal development rather than changes in economic growth. 
Impulse response function
The dynamic behavior of the system could be estimated with the help of an impulse response function as it captures the impact of a shock or innovation to a variable in the system on all the other variables. We have used Choleski decomposition method suggested by Doan (1989) to factorize the variance-covariance matrix to identify the orthogonalized shocks. These results could change dramatically as the first variable in the specification is attributed with all the effect of common variation. As proposed in the literature we have tried a number of different ordering of the variables. The results are summarized in table 6. The impact of legal development on financial sector development is around 4% where as the impact of it on economic growth is negligent after 5 years and negative after 10 years. Both financial sector development and economic growth seem to have a persistent impact on them due to their own shocks rather than shocks to other variables in the system. However innovations in financial sector have a considerable impact on economic growth.
Variance decompositions
The percentage variance of each variable in the system due to unexpected shocks to one of the variables could be determined by breaking down the forecast error variance of the target variable in each future period. This method called variance decomposition would give relative importance of shocks to each variable in the system with respect to target variable. As summarized in table 7 legal development explains about 17% of the variations in financial development but explains only a little variation in economic growth.
Institutions:
As legal development, Contract Intensive Money (CIM), the indicator for institutional development is introduced in the system along with economic growth and the measures of financial sector growth. As CIM is a broad measure of confidence on the system especially in securing property rights and enforcing contracts we expect CIM to affect economic growth independent of financial sector. As financial sector requires high level of confidence/trust in the system, improvements in CIM would make it possible to use innovative financial instruments thus would affect economic growth indirectly by enhancing financial sector growth.
As contract intensive money (CIM) is also integrated of the order one, we test for cointegrating relationship among the variables in the system. Both trace statistic and Max Eigenvalues test results show that there is at least one cointegrating relationship among the variables as the hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 5 % level. 
VECM Results for Institutions
Cointegrating vectors presented in the second column of the table show the long run relationship among institutional indicator, economic growth with respect to financial sector growth as the vector is normalized with respect to financial sector growth. All the parameters for institutional variable contract intensive money (CIM) seem to have right sign however only in the FDM specification it is significant. Also the adjustment parameters have right sign for CIM. These two put together indicate that there is a positive robust long run equilibrium relation between financial sector and institutional development. As cointegrating coefficients could be interpreted as a long run response of financial sector with respect to economic growth and institutional development, a larger magnitude for CIM indicates the relative importance of institutional developments over economic growth in the long run. 
Financial Regulation:
The composite index of financial sector regulation is introduced in the system to test the impact of policy on economic growth and financial sector growth. We expect this index would affect financial sector negatively thus would curtail economic growth. Cointegration test results show at least one cointegrating relationship among the variables however trace statistic shows two cointegrating vectors for the FDM specification, where we make use of the first cointegrating vector that have the highest eigenvalue. Financial sector regulation as proposed in the literature is expected to negatively affect both financial sector growth and economic growth. Thus, it should carry a positive sign in the cointegrating relationship. The cointegrating parameters for financial regulation do have the correct signs and are insignificant only in the case of index of financial development (FD). Adjustment coefficients also have right signs and are statistically significant. The results show that there is a negative long run relationship between financial regulation and financial sector development. Our results are consistent with the results reported in the literature (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996) .
Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to capture the impact of legal development, financial sector regulation and institutional developments with the help of innovative measures on financial sector development and economic growth in a trivariate time series framework. We use a number of financial sector measures to captures the size and the ability of the system to channel the funds. We specify one of the determinants of financial sector development i.e. legal (LD), institutional (CIM) and financial regulation (FR) indices along with financial development and economic growth in a VAR system. We identify a single cointegrating vector in all of the specifications indicating that there is a long run equilibrium relationship among the variables considered.
These results show that legal, institutional developments positively affect financial sector growth in the long run and financial regulation has a negative impact. Causality tests confirm a robust causal relationship between all these measures and financial sector growth with a considerable feed back from the latter to the former. Thus the phenomenal growth in Indian financial sector could be attributed to legal developments, improvements in property rights protection and contract enforcement and positive changes in regulatory environment. These findings are consistent with law and finance literature (Levine, 2005) .
Most importantly, we show a robust causal relationship between the measures of financial sector growth and real economic activity with little feed back from the latter. However with the monetary specification of financial sector (FDM) there is a strong feedback effect at 5 percent significant level. This, however inconclusive, is consistent with the literature as many of the studies (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel and Khan, 1999) report mixed results. Also, legal development, institutional development and financial deregulation cause economic growth directly and indirectly through financial sector growth.
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